Refugee Policy: A Cruel Bipartisanship by Dehm, S & Walden, M
593
26
Refugee Policy: A Cruel 
Bipartisanship
Sara Dehm and Max Walden
Facing the media after a reported 5.6 per cent swing against him in 
the Brisbane seat of Dickson, Australian Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection Peter Dutton defiantly declared that the Coalition was 
‘a victim of our own success’.1 ‘The fact that we stopped boats and got 
children out of detention’, Dutton asserted, meant the ‘issue’ of ‘border 
protection’ and people arriving in Australia unauthorised by boat to seek 
asylum ‘had gone off the radar’ (quoted in Hutchens 2016). The minister’s 
assertion was certainly provocative, if a little misleading. While Australia’s 
policies towards refugees and asylum seekers did not appear to feature 
prominently in the 2016 election campaign, this was largely due to 
a  confluence of circumstances, not all of which were of the Coalition’s 
making. These circumstances primarily included the bipartisan support 
for the three key pillars of Australia’s increasingly draconian deterrence 
model (namely, boat turn backs, regional processing and the mandatory 
detention of certain asylum seekers) and the exceptional government 
censorship of information from inside immigration detention centres 
and the official secrecy surrounding the implementation of Australia’s 
military-led Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). This meant that the 
Coalition and Labor had both orchestrated a situation where there seemed 
1  At the time that Dutton faced the media, a 5.6 per cent swing was reported. The final result was 
a 5.12 per cent swing away from the minister.
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to be little political mileage to be gained from foregrounding the issue of 
Australia’s refugee laws and policies during the campaign. Instead, the 
election contest predominantly played out across more traditional issues 
of economic and social policy, such as job creation and the funding of 
healthcare. Despite being a highly volatile political issue, refugee policy 
could rarely be seen to determine the outcome of elections—perhaps 
with the exception of the Coalition’s major 2001 electoral victory in the 
wake of the Tampa affair. Since 2004, fewer than 10 per cent of surveyed 
voters have ranked the issue of ‘refugees and asylum seekers’ as the ‘most 
important non-economic issue’ in federal elections (McAllister and 
Cameron 2014: 21).
Despite the lack of prominence given by the two major political parties 
to the issue of refugee policy relative to previous election campaigns, 
it nonetheless surfaced at key moments to reveal its political potency. 
For example, some minor political parties, certain media outlets and 
community activist groups were particularly vocal on the issue. This 
chapter argues that these moments attest to both the anxious nature 
of Australian nationalism and multiculturalism, and the increasingly 
prominent deep discursive linkages between asylum seekers, terrorism 
and the securitisation of migration and borders.
International and domestic context
In the lead-up to the 2016 election, political conditions appeared ripe 
for the issue of Australia’s refugee laws and policies to feature prominently 
in the federal election campaign. Globally, the number of refugees, asylum 
seekers and forcibly displaced people had reached a peak of 65.3 million 
in early 2016, amounting to a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen since 
the aftermath of World War II (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) 2016). Domestically, Australia’s laws and 
policies towards refugees and asylum seekers—specifically those people 
who are categorised under Australian law as ‘unauthorised maritime 
arrivals’—have featured as a divisive but not necessarily determinative 
issue in almost every federal Australian election since the 1970s. In this 
section, we posit that four important factors shaped the appearance of 
the issue of Australia’s refugee policies in the lead-up to the 2016 federal 
election. These are (1) the rise of a politics of border security as a frame 
for understanding the unauthorised arrival of asylum seekers by boat in 
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Australia’s waters and the reintroduction of regional detention and offshore 
processing arrangements since 2012; (2)  the  deteriorating conditions 
for people held in Australian-run onshore and offshore immigration 
detention centres; (3) the heightened domestic and international scrutiny 
of Australia’s detention regime including through legal challenges; and 
(4)  a revitalisation of transnational activism to challenge Australia’s 
refugee deterrence paradigm since early 2016. While the latter three 
factors would appear to give momentum to an increased visibility of the 
issue of refugee policies in the lead-up to the 2016 election, ultimately the 
nature and dominance of the first factor proved to be the most decisive. 
We thus argue that the uneasy bipartisanship between the Coalition and 
the Australian Labor Party (ALP) around the adoption of an increasingly 
punitive deterrence model towards people travelling unauthorised to 
Australia by boat to seek asylum played a key role in marginalise the issue 
during the election campaign.
First, the Australian government’s adoption of a heightened deterrence 
paradigm towards asylum seekers arriving unauthorised in Australian 
waters by boat since August 2012—and the subsequent implementation 
of OSB under the previous Abbott government (2013–15)—had seen 
the intensification of a politics of border security and practices of border 
securitisation and militarisation (Grewcock 2014). This paradigm 
entailed the turning back of boats carrying asylum seekers to source 
countries such as Vietnam or transit countries like Indonesia, increasing 
the capacity of the two offshore Regional Processing Centres (RPCs) in 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru, and reintroducing Temporary Protection 
Visas (TPVs) for certain refugees in Australia in the period leading 
up to the election. Moreover, in framing the phenomenon of people 
travelling to Australia by boat to seek asylum as a ‘national emergency’ 
and inaccurately deeming them ‘illegal maritime arrivals’ since 2014, such 
policies have further contributed towards the perception that refugees and 
asylum seekers should be seen as a potential threat to the ‘security’ of 
the Australian nation-state (Glendenning 2015). Praising the successes of 
OSB in ‘regaining control over Australia’s borders’ would be central to the 
Coalition’s campaigning on refugee issues during the election, allowing 
the Coalition to repeatedly invoke the threat of a future crisis while also 
defending their current policies and track record.
Since assuming government in 2013, the Coalition had sought to use 
refugee policy to make the ALP look weak and divided, despite supporting 
Labor’s reintroduction of a model of regional offshore detention and 
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processing in August 2012. In particular, Tony Abbott’s adoption of the 
practice of turning back boats carrying asylum seekers en route to Australia 
remained a controversial policy in the early years of his government, not 
least because of Indonesia’s vocal opposition to it. When Bill Shorten 
took over as Opposition Leader in October 2013, he actively sought to 
‘neutralise’ the issue. This included successfully urging the party at the 
ALP national conference in July 2015 to endorse the Coalition’s practice of 
turning back asylum seeker boats. As a result, much of the ALP’s rhetoric 
in the lead-up to the 2016 election and during the campaign increasingly 
echoed that of the Coalition. For example, when challenged in relation 
to divisions within his parliamentary party on refugee policy during the 
campaign, Shorten reiterated Labor’s support for both the policy of boat 
turn backs and offshore processing and declared that if elected the ALP 
would not ‘put the people smugglers back in business’ (Massola 2016).
The militarised approach for dealing with people seeking asylum 
adopted under OSB was accompanied by heightened secrecy around 
the implementation and effects of refugee policies by early 2016. Key 
legislative reforms, such as the adoption of the Australian Border Force Act 
2015 (Cth), which was passed with bipartisan support but was opposed 
by the Greens, rrestricted the ability of certain professionals working in 
Australia’s immigration detention regime to lawfully voice their concerns 
about the effects of Australia’s refugee policies on people subject to the 
regime or to criticise the policies themselves. Indeed, these legislative 
changes drew sharp criticism from legal experts and human rights advocates 
for their suppression of whistleblowers. Under the then Act, contracted 
workers like doctors, teachers or other personnel in RPCs faced up to two 
years in prison for speaking publicly about the conditions or treatment of 
asylum seekers (Fleay 2015).2 Despite this alarming lack of transparency 
and silencing of professionals, there was still a number of exposés, in the 
form of testimony from whistleblowers or official documents obtained 
under freedom of information, in the lead-up to the 2016 election.
2  Subsequent to the 2016 election, the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection (DIBP) amended a legislative instrument in September 2016 ahead of a High 
Court challenge to exempt ‘health practitioners’ from the definition of ‘Immigration and Border 
Protection workers’ under the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth). See also DIBP, Determination 
of Immigration and Border Protection Workers—Amendment No. 1, 30 September 2016. Further 
significant legislative changes to the Act passed both Houses of Parliament in October 2017.
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Second, the lead-up to the election saw mounting evidence of the 
worsening treatment of people seeking asylum or found to be refugees 
in Australian-run onshore and offshore immigration detention centres, 
and in the region more generally. Reports emerged of negligence and 
abuse by contractors operating within the RPCs and of the high levels 
of self-harm among refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, in January 
2016, internal Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
(DIBP) documents obtained under freedom of information showed that 
self-harm within both the onshore and offshore immigration detention 
centres had reached ‘epidemic levels’ (Koziol and Hasham 2016). A few 
months later in April 2016, the ABC’s Four Corners program reported that 
senior doctors with experience of working in immigration detention were 
speaking out to highlight the ‘dangerously inadequate’ medical care in the 
Manus Island RPC (Thompson and Harley 2016). In response to such 
criticisms, the Australian government simply deflected its responsibility 
by repeatedly claiming that the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs were 
managed by the governments of PNG and Nauru respectively, under local 
laws, albeit with Australian support. Further media stories kept the issue 
of Australia’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the national 
spotlight, including evidence that the Royal Australian Navy had paid 
people smugglers to return asylum seekers to Indonesia. Regionally, in 
the years leading up to the 2016 election, Australian taxpayer-funded 
immigration detention centres across the Indonesian archipelago had 
also became desperately overcrowded and unhygienic, with claims that 
detained asylum seekers were being beaten and tortured (Missbach and 
Sinanu 2013).
Meanwhile, the Australian government adopted the dual tactics of 
pressuring people held in the Nauru or Manus Island RPCs to either return 
to their country of nationality or participate in third-country resettlement 
schemes. In September 2014, Australia signed a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding with Cambodia that enabled people found to be refugees 
in the Nauru RPC to voluntarily resettle in Cambodia on a permanent 
basis. The UNHCR criticised the $55 million arrangement, labelling 
it ‘a worrying departure from international norms’ and asserting that 
‘it’s  crucial that countries do not shift their refugee responsibilities 
elsewhere’ (UNHCR 2014). By 2016, it was clear that this arrangement 
proved to be ‘a failure’, with only five people opting to participate in 
the resettlement scheme, all but one of whom would eventually opt to 
‘voluntarily’ return to their home countries (Murdoch and Koziol 2016).
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In Australia, many asylum seekers and refugees faced an increasingly 
precarious existence, largely because of the increasingly punitive 
government measures to limit people’s rights to work and to family 
reunification (Fleay and Hartley 2016). The reintroduction of TPVs and 
Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (SHEVs) in December 2014 as the only 
visas available to people considered part of the so-called Asylum Legacy 
Caseload—a collective term for the approximately 30,000 people who 
arrived by boat between 2012 and 2014 and who were at the time yet to 
have their refugee claims processed and living in Australia on Bridging 
Visas—meant that any person who was subsequently found to be 
a  refugee, but who had arrived in Australia unauthorised by boat, was 
unable to sponsor family members to join them in Australia (Crock and 
Bones 2015). Moreover, the Abbott government’s adoption in December 
2013 of a Code of Behaviour meant that asylum seekers living in the 
Australian community were subject to additional surveillance and the 
possibility of severe punishment for minor infractions (Methven and 
Vogl 2015).
Third, in the lead-up to the election, Australia faced increased domestic 
and international scrutiny of OSB and its offshore detention and 
processing arrangements, including through judicial challenges. Several 
reports from UN agencies found that Australia’s policies constituted 
breaches of international laws, including the prohibition on subjecting 
people to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (United Nations 
Human Rights Council 2014). For example, the riots in the Manus 
Island RPC in February 2014 had spurred the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Ravina Shamdasani, to criticise Australia and urge the 
Australian government to change its offshore detention and processing 
policy, or at the very least take ‘steps to investigate, redress and punish 
human rights abuses by third parties’ (quoted in Cumming-Bruce 2014). 
Domestic inquiries also called for policy change, with the Australian 
Human Rights Commission’s (AHRC) inquiry into children in detention 
tabled in Parliament in February 2015, asserting that the ‘mandatory and 
prolonged detention of children was a clear violation of international 
law’, and issuing a recommendation to end to the mandatory detention 
of children and their families (AHRC 2014). The recommendations of 
both the UNHCR and the AHRC fell on deaf ears. Then prime minister 
Abbott instead defiantly responded to the Special Rapporteur’s report by 
declaring that Australians were ‘sick of being lectured to by the United 
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Nations’ (quoted in Cox 2015), and launched an all-out personal attack 
on the AHRC President Gillian Triggs, accusing her of publishing a ‘stitch 
up’ and publicly calling for her resignation.
A significant challenge to Australia’s deterrence regime came in the lead-
up to the 2016 election in the form of a legal case within Papua New 
Guinea’s (PNG) legal system. On 26 April 2016, the PNG Supreme 
Court, the highest judicial body in PNG, decided that the detention 
of asylum seekers in the Manus Island RPC was illegal as it breached 
the right to freedom of movement under the PNG Constitution. The 
Court thus ordered both the PNG and Australian governments to take 
‘all steps necessary’ to end the illegal detention of the approximately 
850 people in the Manus Island RPC (Namah v Pato [2016] SCA 84 of 
2013 (PNG)). While the PNG decision provided an opportunity for the 
Coalition government to end the much-criticised and harmful policy of 
offshore detention and processing, the government staunchly refused to 
do so. Rather, Dutton vowed that the PNG decision would not change 
Australia’s policies and that no one from the Manus Island RPC would 
be resettled in Australia (Tlozek and Anderson 2016). The government 
also again rejected an offer from New Zealand to permanently resettle 
a portion of the refugees, thus offering little alternative for resolving their 
legal obligations under PNG and international law and prolonging the 
suffering and uncertainty for the people interned on Manus Island.
Finally, the period leading up to the 2016 election saw the emergence 
of revitalised transnational activism from both within Australia’s RPCs 
and the Australian community. Refugees and asylum seekers held 
continuous protests within both the Nauru and Manus Island RPCs as a 
way of highlighting the conditions of their incarceration and demanding 
proper pathways to permanent protection. In the middle of the election 
campaign in June 2016, the protests within the Nauru RPC passed 100 
consecutive days. The photos and videos of these protests were shared by 
concerned Australians on social media and covered by some mainstream 
media outlets (Michael 2016).
At the same time, a mass social media campaign emerged in Australia 
during February 2016 under the slogan of #LetThemStay, following 
a failed High Court challenge to halt the deportation of a pregnant 
Bangladeshi woman back to the Nauru RPC. This High Court decision 
meant that 267 asylum seekers and refugees who had been transferred 
from a RPC to Australia for medical treatment could be legally deported 
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back to a RPC (see Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (2016) 257 CLR 42). In response to such activism 
and community concern, Victorian Labor Premier Daniel Andrews, 
supported by then New South Wales Liberal Premier Mike Baird, 
prominently called for a ‘better’ solution to asylum-seeker policy than 
offshore detention and processing, and expressed a willingness to host 
refugees, particularly children and their families, so that they would not 
be returned to a RPC. The movement gained some further success, when 
medical staff at a Brisbane hospital refused to discharge 12-month-old 
‘baby Asha’ in defiance of the government’s position, with her family 
subsequently being settled in community detention in Australia. Further 
protests from professional, faith-based and community groups generated 
new political momentum for policy change, with over 100 churches 
offering sanctuary to those affected by the High Court decision. By April 
2016, approximately half of the 267 asylum seekers at the centre of the 
Let Them Stay protests had been granted Bridging Visas that allowed 
them to remain in community detention in Australia (Oriti 2016). These 
protests gave increased national prominence to both the harmful effects 
of the current deterrence regime on people seeking asylum and articulated 
increasingly vocal calls for reform from within and beyond the refugee 
sector, and from the affected refugees and asylum seekers themselves.
The election campaign
Despite the confluence of circumstances that could have prompted a more 
prominent place for the issue of Australia’s refugee policies in the 2016 
federal election campaign, there instead appeared to be a peculiar shift away 
from the two major political parties foregrounding this issue. As noted 
previously, this was primarily because of the increasingly bipartisan support 
for the three key pillars of Australia’s increasingly draconian deterrence-
oriented model regarding asylum seekers in Australia. These pillars are the 
mandatory detention of people seeking asylum, the implementation of 
offshore processing and the practice of turning back asylum seeker boats 
en route to Australia. Nonetheless, in remaining more of an undercurrent 
in the election campaign, we argue that the issue of Australia’s refugee 
policies did still appear at discrete moments during the campaign. As we 
discuss below, these moments involved contests around the ‘appropriate’ 
numbers of people to be admitted under Australia’s ‘offshore’ humanitarian 
program; attempts to emphasise internal party divisions and instability 
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within Labor; and, finally, appeals to maintaining the ‘integrity’ and 
control of the ‘Australian border’—an end that has increasingly been 
infused with a rhetoric of instrumental humanitarianism that purports to 
be concerned with ‘saving lives at sea’.
By and large, the increasing bipartisan support for a deterrence paradigm 
toward people attempting to seek asylum in Australia in recent years has 
meant that the main difference between the Coalition and Labor policies 
during the election campaign was in relation to the offshore resettlement 
component of Australia’s humanitarian program. Here, the difference 
between the major parties appeared to be a contest over the number of 
people to be admitted under the offshore resettlement program and how 
to rhetorically frame this program. In their election campaign material, 
the Coalition’s policy on refugees and asylum seekers appeared under the 
heading ‘Protecting our Borders’, and promised to maintain Australia’s 
current annual humanitarian intake of 13,750 people, rising to 18,750 
people in 2018–19. This number did not include the Abbott government’s 
announcement in September 2015 that it would accept a one-off intake 
of 12,000 refugees displaced by the Syrian and Iraq conflicts. In contrast, 
Labor titled their policy ‘A Humane and Compassionate Approach to 
Asylum Seekers’, and pledged to eventually double the number of people 
resettled in Australia under the offshore resettlement program, amounting 
to an increased annual intake of 27,000 people by 2025. Labor also 
committed to abolishing the use of TPVs that had been reintroduced 
under the Abbott government in December 2014. The Greens, as a third 
force in Australian politics, positioned themselves as a direct alternative 
to the Coalition and Labor’s bipartisan deterrence paradigm, and strongly 
advocated for a rights-based approach of the processing of asylum seekers 
and refugees in Australia. Entitled ‘A Better Way’, the Greens’ policy 
promised an increase of Australia’s annual offshore humanitarian intake 
to 50,000 people. They also proposed adopting a new Skilled Refugee 
Visa program for 10,000 people, a measure that had long been called for 
by the Refugee Council of Australia (RCA) (see Table 26.1).
Interestingly, there was an implicit acknowledgement across all three of 
the major parties’ policies that it is desirable to increase the number of 
places available annually in Australia’s offshore humanitarian resettlement 
program over time, although neither the Coalition nor Labor advanced an 
explicit argument as to the basis of this decision. On a more fundamental 
level, the contests over these figures reveal an underlying dynamic of what 
Ghassan Hage has termed ‘numerological racism’ (2014: 233). For Hage, 
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this denotes a racism of numbers in which discussing the admission of 
non-citizens to Australia ‘always comes with the category of “too many”’; 
that is, a sense that Australia currently takes or could take ‘too many’ 
refugees to the detriment of the national collective, and that the task for 
the Australian government is to find the appropriate numerical intake. 
Writing in the context of Pauline Hanson’s anti-Asian racism in the late 
1990s, Hage (1998: 186–89) suggested that such sentiments rely upon 
a  ‘fantasy of domination’ in which the white sovereign decision-maker 
has the primary responsibility of controlling how many people deemed to 
be the ‘Other’ are to be admitted into the Australian nation, thus seeking 
to either restore or maintain a ‘proper’ balance to multicultural diversity. 
For Hage, such a dynamic reveals the insecure and anxious nature of 
Australian nationalism and the foundational norms underpinning 
practices of Australian multiculturalism (see also Hage 2003).





‘A Humane and Compassionate 









27,000 people in 2025 50,000 in 2016
‘Onshore’ program for people travelling unauthorised to Australia by boat 
to seek asylum
Mandatory 














Abolish TPVs Abolish TPVs
Boat turn backs yes yes No
Reform of offshore 
processing
No change Expedite processing of claims









Initiate a Royal 
Commission to 
investigate
Source . Compiled by authors from the election campaign materials of the Coalition (Liberal 
Party of Australia (LPA) 2016a), Australian Labor Party (ALP 2016) and Greens (Australian 
Greens 2016) .
603
26 . REFUGEE POLICy
During the election campaign, the competing figures around Australia’s 
offshore humanitarian resettlement program became the subject of 
controversy following the appearance of Minister Dutton on a Sky News 
program as a guest of conservative host Paul Murray. Responding to 
Murray’s outrage at the Greens’ proposal to increase the size of Australia’s 
humanitarian program, Dutton stated that refugees admitted under 
Australia’s offshore humanitarian resettlement program were prone 
to  unemployment and thus contributed to the government’s spending 
on social security. The minister’s remarks played on a long-held public 
misconception that asylum seekers receive greater welfare payments than 
members of the overall population (Phillips 2015). It is worth quoting 
Dutton’s remarks at length for their contradictory framing of refugees as 
at once dependent upon social security and also ‘taking Australian jobs’:
For many people, they won’t be numerate or literate in their own language 
let alone English … These people would be taking Australian jobs. There’s 
no question about that. And for many of them that would be unemployed, 
they would languish in unemployment queues and on Medicare, and the 
rest of it. So there would be a huge cost (cited in Bourke 2016).
Yet, despite the seeming contradiction in Dutton’s remarks, at the heart of 
his comment is a representation of refugees as ‘extractive’ beings: as taking 
things to which Dutton suggests refugees should not be properly entitled 
(see Figure 26.1).
Commentators were quick to note that Dutton’s incendiary comments, 
in constructing refugees as both a financial burden on the Australian 
taxpayers as well as a threat to the livelihood of ‘Australian workers’, 
misconstrued official data that demonstrates a majority of refugees 
resettled in Australia are in fact literate in their own language, understand 
spoken English on arrival and bring a net benefit to the Australian 
community and economy in the long run (Maddison 2016; Voon and 
Higgins 2016). Yet, interestingly, both Dutton’s remarks and the outraged 
reactions to them engaged in the same rationalist calculation in which the 
legitimacy of the presence of refugees and asylum seekers within Australia 
is framed as a question of the ‘burden’ or ‘benefit’ that they bring to the 
nation. As Danielle Every (2008) has argued, such rationalist calculations 
reflect a dialectic within liberal humanitarianism that oscillates between 




The following day, in defence of his comments and further labouring 
the idea of refugees as fiscal burdens, Dutton claimed that the Greens’ 
policy would cost $7 billion over four years while Labor’s proposals would 
cost $2.3 billion over the same period (Baxendale 2016). Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull too, in coming to Dutton’s defence as an ‘outstanding 
immigration minister’, claimed that Dutton’s remarks merely reflected 
the fact that people resettled under Australia’s offshore humanitarian 
program came from ‘dreadful, devastated, war-torn regions of the world’ 
(quoted in Keany and Anderson 2016). Opposition leader Shorten in 
turn seized on Dutton’s remarks, labelled the Immigration Minister’s 
comments ‘xenophobic’, ‘offensive’ and ‘deeply divisive’. Claiming that 
the Coalition was seeking to ‘undermine the migrant contribution to 
Australia because they don’t want this election to be about the issues that 
matter to Australians’, Shorten demanded that Dutton apologise for his 
remarks (quoted in Keany and Anderson 2016). While no apology was 
issued, it is telling that the main election campaign controversy pertaining 
to refugee policies was over a ministerial remark, rather than over the 
substance and effects of Australia’s hardline deterrence policies.
Figure 26.1. Refugees and the 2016 election
Source. Cathy Wilcox, ‘Those invaluable refugees’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 
2016. Reproduced with the permission of Cathy Wilcox.
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Throughout the campaign, the Coalition repeatedly used the question 
of refugee policy to suggest deep internal divisions within the Labor 
opposition. In his address to the federal campaign rally in late June 
2016, Turnbull claimed that during their time in government, Labor 
had ‘failed Australia at the border’ by dismantling Howard-era refugee 
policies (LPA 2016b). Turnbull warned that the electorate could not risk 
a return to Labor given that 50 Labor candidates, Members of Parliament 
(MPs) and Senators allegedly did not currently support the government’s 
deterrence model towards people arriving unauthorised by boat to 
seek asylum. To bolster this claim, the Liberal Party hosted an online 
website with a collage of images and quotes from Labor politicians and 
candidates who had come out in support of the #LetThemStay campaign 
or who had opposed the ALP adoption of a policy of ‘boat turn backs’ 
(Whatlaborreallythinks 2016). Rather than embracing the fact that there 
existed a diversity of views within his party, Shorten responded by framing 
the issue of dissent as one that had disappeared after the Labor Conference 
in 2015, insisting that the ALP now had the same deterrence policy as 
the Coalition. Yet such a proposition occluded the ongoing contestation 
about these policies within both the ALP and, to a lesser extent, the 
Coalition. This was evident, for example, in a minor controversy that 
occurred in the early weeks of the campaign, where Labor’s candidate 
for the seat of Melbourne, Sophie Ismail, publicly stated that she had 
grave concerns about the policies of offshore processing and turning back 
asylum seeker boats en route to Australia. It is unclear how much traction 
the Liberal website, whatlaborreallythinks, actually received. What is clear 
is the government’s perception that it could still make refugee policy into 
a partisan issue, despite Shorten’s best efforts to neutralise it, and that years 
of positioning the Coalition as tough on the issue of ‘border protection’ 
had seemingly shaped voter judgement about the parties. For example, 
a poll conducted by Essential Vision in late May 2016 found that only 
28 per cent of poll respondents believed Labor would keep the Coalition’s 
policy on asylum seekers arriving by boat (Essential Vision 2016).
Finally, the election campaign saw the issue of refugee policies largely 
framed within the context of ‘border security’, with both Turnbull and 
Shorten using their respective refugee policies to present themselves as 
‘strong’ leaders committed to ‘protecting’ Australia’s borders. This was 
most apparent early in the Coalition’s campaign when Turnbull visited 
an Australian Border Force (ABF) vessel docked in Darwin on 17 May 
2016. Standing in front of the ACV Cape Jervis, Turnbull declared that 
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the ‘protection of Australia’s borders is a political issue’. Praising the 
professionalism of the ABF, Turnbull appealed to his government’s track 
record and commitment in ‘keeping our borders secure’. He added that:
There are currently 1,400 people in Indonesia right now who came 
to Indonesia during the period of the Labor government in the hope 
that they would be able to get on a people smuggler’s boat and come 
to Australia. And they know that they can’t get through because of the 
commitment of my government; my government’s determination to 
stop the boats and turn them back when we intercept them at sea. And 
that’s why there’s been no more boats. That’s why it’s been over 600 days 
without any unauthorised arrivals (quoted in Koziol 2016).
Dutton promoted this conflation between border protection, national 
security and asylum-seeker policies in a last-minute effort to gain voter 
confidence. The day before the federal election, Dutton explicitly linked 
the unauthorised arrival of asylum seekers in states with the occurrence 
of terrorist acts, suggesting that the political violence in parts of Europe 
was the product of countries having ‘lost control’ of their borders. On the 
Labor side, Shorten sought to regain ground in the area of national security 
following claims of criminal syndicates and people smugglers rorting the 
Australian visa system in late June. However, these allegations, coming late 
in the election campaign, failed to generate much political controversy or 
inflict political damage on the sitting Coalition government.
A further example of the Coalition’s willingness to politicise the issue of 
refugee policy came a little over a week out from the election, when the 
Turnbull government announced that it had rerouted a boat with 21 asylum 
seekers en route to Australia back to Vietnam. The Coalition attempted 
to use this as further evidence that ‘the challenge of people smuggling is 
greater than it has ever been’ and that Labor’s policy of abolishing TPVs 
would send an ‘invitation’ to people smugglers to resume their trade in 
human lives (ABC Radio 2016). Labor, given their support of the boat 
turn-back policy, was left with little room for criticising the actual action, 
opting to instead question the delayed timing of the announcement 
given that the boat had been intercepted and returned earlier in June. 
Shorten responded by labelling border security the Coalition’s ‘break-glass 
issue’. This instance revealingly demonstrated the Coalition’s readiness to 
disregard their prohibition on discussing ‘on water operational matters’ 
for the sake of political expediency.
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Tellingly, the bipartisan deterrence paradigm was increasingly infused 
with a humanitarian rhetoric throughout the 2016 election campaign. 
For example, during his appearance on the national Q&A program on 
ABC television, Turnbull framed the issue of the indefinite detention of 
people in RPCs as one of a resolute determination to combat people being 
exploited by people smugglers, and to ensure that no person drowns at sea 
while attempting to reach Australia by boat (Boochani 2016). Turnbull’s 
comments were in response to a question asked via video from the Manus 
Island RPC by Behrouz Boochani, a Kurdish Iranian journalist who has 
spent more than three years in PNG. Turnbull remarked:
We have learnt the tragic truth that when the very strict and clear border 
protection policies of the Howard government were … undone by Kevin 
Rudd, we had 50,000 unlawful arrivals, we had 1,200 deaths at sea of 
which we know. It was a catastrophe. Now we have been able to secure 
the security on the border. The people smugglers are out of business. They 
would love to get back into business. They are itching to get back into 
business … We have had no unauthorised arrivals … for well over 660 
days … It is a tough policy, I grant you that (quoted in Boochani 2016).
Turnbull’s response here advances a form of instrumental humanitarianism 
that posits that denying people arriving without authorisation access 
to asylum and incarcerating others is not only good for Australia as 
a nation, but also serves as a humane and justified means of preventing 
loss of life and human exploitation. Yet as Maria O’Sullivan (2016) has 
argued, Australia’s policies that prioritise formal resettlement schemes 
while preventing and penalising anyone who seeks asylum outside the 
parameters of such schemes is ethically unacceptable. For O’Sullivan, 
such an approach risks denying individual agency to refugees to decide 
their mode of accessing asylum and comes at an ‘extremely high cost to 
the individual rights of other persons who receive punitive treatment 
for not using a planned process’ (2016: 256). This form of instrumental 
humanitarianism then bolsters rather than displaces the securitisation of 
migration and seeks to delegitimise the asylum rights of people travelling 
to Australia without authorisation.
Commentators dispute what is driving the bipartisan policy towards 
refugees. Polls released during the 2016 election campaign suggest that 
most Australians do not fully support the bipartisan hardline approach 
towards people seeking asylum. For example, a poll surveying 1,400 people 
commissioned by the Australia Institute (2016) found that 63 per cent 
of respondents opposed the bipartisan policy that did not allow refugees 
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who have travelled without authorisation by boat to settle in Australia. 
A  further poll for the Lowy Institute (2016) claimed that 57 per cent 
and 58 per cent of respondents regarded ‘immigration’ and ‘refugees 
and asylum seekers’ as very important issues for Australia, respectively; 
however, such statistics fail to reveal the particular values placed upon the 
issue. The Australian Election Survey (AES) has shown declining support 
for the practice of turning back asylum seeker boats over the last 15 years, 
with 62 per cent of respondents supporting the practice in 2001 compared 
to 49 per cent in 2013 (McAllister and Cameron 2014). In contrast, the 
2016 Lowy Institute survey showed that 63 per cent of Australians appear 
to support the controversial policy of asylum seeker boat ‘turn backs’. 
It also found, however, that 73 per cent of those surveyed agreed that 
immigration has a positive impact on the Australian economy (Lowy 
Institute 2016). These mixed poll results support the findings of Murray 
Goot and Ian Watson (2011), who observed that the outcome of polls 
concerning immigration often depended upon the particular way in 
which the question was asked. For example, survey polls reporting high 
levels of opposition to refugee and migrants appeared to encourage such 
responses through the particular wording of the question.
Despite both the Coalition and Labor’s overall reluctance to elevate the 
issue of refugee policy to the status of a major party platform or to a key 
election slogan, it did receive notable coverage in the mainstream media. 
The Murdoch-owned News Corp press appeared particularly willing to 
cover, in an incendiary manner, the issue of people arriving unauthorised 
to Australia by boat. For example, during the second week of the campaign, 
News Corp’s Herald Sun (Australia’s highest circulating newspaper) ran 
the headline ‘Shorten Holed on Boats’, with the subtitle of ‘Seven Labor 
Candidates at Odds with Opposition Leader on Asylum Seekers’ (Harris 
2016). As discussed in Andrea Carson and Brian McNair (Chapter 19, 
this volume), data monitoring of print and online media during the 
election campaign indicates that asylum seeker issues repeatedly appeared 
among the top five issues discussed within the mainstream media in 
a given week. This prominence is also reflected in analyses of alternative 
media and social media platforms (see Chen, Chapter 20, this volume).
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Legacies of the 2016 election
Undoubtedly, the bipartisan nature of the three main tenets that make up 
Australia’s current policies towards people seeking asylum—mandatory 
detention, regional processing and boat turn backs—meant that there was 
little to distinguish the campaign policies of Labor and the Coalition. 
When Labor was prepared to concede that differences existed between the 
two parties’ policies, it was differences in procedure rather than substance. 
For example, the ALP promised to expedite the processing of claims in 
RPCs and to facilitate increased transparency by pushing for journalists to 
have access to these centres.
One legacy of the election campaign has been the success of new 
electoral tactics adopted by several prominent refugee and human rights 
advocacy organisations. While many NGOs appeared reluctant to push 
directly for a discussion of Australia’s refugee policy during the election 
campaign for fear of a ‘race to the bottom’ between both major parties, 
some organisations still encouraged voters to consider the issue of 
refugee policy at the ballot. The RCA, for example, released a briefing 
paper that compared the policies and measures of the two major political 
parties and the Greens in the hope of promoting national dialogue and 
voter awareness of the issue (RCA 2016). The most successful of these 
campaigns was that coordinated by the non–party affiliated progressive 
organisation GetUp!, who adopted the strategy of targeting seats held by 
the conservative right wing of the Liberal Party on the basis that such 
politicians were ‘standing in the way of progress’ on key issues such as 
climate action (see Vromen, Chapter 18, this volume). Most notably, this 
strategy included targeting Dutton in his Brisbane electorate of Dickson, 
a seat held by Dutton for the Liberal–National Party (LNP) since 2001. 
After the 2013 election, Dutton had a comfortable 6.7 per cent margin. 
Following the 2016 election, this margin was reduced to 3.2 per cent, 
resulting in LNP fears that Dutton may lose his seat in what eventually 
amounted to a 5.12 per cent swing against him on a two-party preferred 
count (more than double the national average swing against the LNP). 
Dutton himself cited GetUp!’s campaign as a reason why he had had 
a ‘very tough campaign’ marked by continuous protests. Indeed, the 
GetUp! campaign, titled ‘Time to Ditch Dutton’, had seen over 28,291 
calls made to voters in Dickson and 294 volunteers on the ground in the 
electorate engaging in a range of activities from door knocking in the 
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weeks leading up to the election to handing out leaflets on election day.3 
This mobilisation constituted one of the largest campaigns run by GetUp! 
in any of the electorates that they targeted during the election campaign 
(GetUp! 2016).
A second legacy of the 2016 election has been the return of Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) to the Australian Parliament on an 
explicitly anti-immigration platform. The party managed to claim four 
Senate seats, most notably two in QLD, and is set to be a decisive force 
in the current Australian Parliament. In the context of refugee policy, 
PHON ran on an overtly nationalist platform of endorsing the system of 
TPVs for refugees, abolishing the bipartisan policy of multiculturalism 
that has been in place in Australia since the 1970s and placing a ban on 
Muslim immigration to Australia, including banning Muslim refugees. 
This latter policy echoed the open xenophobia and Islamophobia of 
right-wing populist movements elsewhere in the USA and Europe, most 
notably seen in Donald Trump’s presidential election campaign and the 
current policies of his administration.
The return of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation to the Australian Parliament 
is certainly troubling for the future direction of Australia’s refugee policies. 
However, the policies advocated by PHON need to be seen as consistent 
with, rather than a challenge to, the key principles of deterrence, 
exclusion and incarceration that have come to underpin Australia’s refugee 
policies since the early 1990s, further coupled with recent articulations of 
Islamophobia in western democracies. Although it may be easy to attribute 
the strong return of One Nation to rising xenophobia in some sections of 
the Australian public, other factors have had a considerable influence on 
the election outcome. Tim Colebatch, for example, has argued that the 
lower threshold for Senate seat quotas in a double-dissolution election as 
well as the senate voting changes were responsible for the seats gained by 
PHON (Colebatch 2016).
Conclusion
The 2016 election may not have been decided on the issue of refugee 
policy, but this issue is almost certainly set to remain prominent on the 
Australian political agenda. This is particularly the case as Australia’s 
3  These figures have been sourced from an email with GetUp! (on file with authors).
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hardline bipartisan approach comes under increased scrutiny and pressure 
from a range of actors including international organisations like the 
UNHCR, domestic judicial bodies such as the High Court, networks of 
refugee advocates and activists, as well as, most importantly, the people 
who have been the subject of these changing policies, either on Manus 
Island and Nauru or living on the Australia mainland. In the aftermath 
of the 2016 election, Australia’s refugee policies again became the subject 
of sustained national and international attention because of the ‘one-
off’ Australia–US refugee resettlement deal signed between the Turnbull 
government and the departing Obama Administration in November 
2016. Under the terms of the agreement, the US agreed to permanently 
resettle in the US up to 1,250 refugees currently on Nauru or Manus 
Island, with priority given to women, children and families. In return, 
Australia agreed to resettle refugees from Central America currently being 
held in Costa Rica. Yet, despite US President Trump in February 2017 
publicly questioning the deal and labelling it ‘dumb’, the arrangement 
has remained in place. US immigration officials interviewed people in 
RPCs in late 2016 and the first group of 52 refugees arrived in the US 
for resettlement in September 2017 (Anderson and Belot 2016; Tlozek 
2017). While this resettlement scheme will provide a durable solution for 
a small number of people to start new lives in a safe country, its ability 
to provide a means of redressing the policy failures and human costs of 
Australia’s offshore processing approach remains doubtful.
The 2016 election demonstrates that the two major parties appear 
unwilling to depart from their bipartisan support of the three key tenets 
of Australia’s deterrence regime towards people travelling to Australia 
to seek protection—namely, the regional detention and processing 
deterrence model, the turning back of asylum seeker boats and the 
mandatory detention of people seeking asylum in Australia. Moreover, key 
moments during the 2016 election revealed the disturbing pervasiveness 
of the discursive construction of refugees and asylum seekers as a threat 
to Australia’s security and identity. Nevertheless, the harmful effects of 
Australia’s policies towards refugees will continue to pose an ongoing 
political and ethical impetus for a change to this troubling bipartisanship. 
It may well be that the issue of Australia’s refugee policy will assume an 
increased visibility at the next federal election if this bipartisanship can be 
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